Updating the LaSalle Bank Fire story
My first post was at 8:42 PM on 12/6
The fire at 135 S. LaSalle has just passed the two hour mark and the fire dept has just started to spray water toward the blown out windows on the 29th floor. That is problematic as the typical fire floor rating is only two hours. This calls into question the whole strategy of having civilians above the fire stay where they are. I have much more to add, but am going back to the coverage for now.
Here are updates I’ve submitted to my editor at The American Thinker. One of the frustrations of being a blogger is that both my editor and I have day jobs so staying current is very hard. So for those interested in matching bloggers vs. the MSM on a live story here is the history of my submissions with times to compare with the published reports of full time reporters. Thomas will eventually get it posted, but for my few fans, this is your chance to see it first.
Here is the original as of 6:33 AM CST on 12/7
There was a fire in the LaSalle Bank Building @ 135 S. LaSalle in Chicago last night. There were no fatalities, but 25 people (mostly firefighters) were hospitalized. Here are some first impressions based on observation of the TV coverage.
1) Once again we are reminded of the power of the forces of nature. The Chicago Fire Department turned out over one-third of its total manpower to fight the blaze.
2) After the first two hours, the total hospitalizations were only eight of which two were firefighters. The balance were presumably from the effects of entering the fire floors to suppress the fire. The courage of these firefighters is obvious.
3) The strategies adopted by the CFD in the wake of the Cook County Administration Building fire in October 2003 likely need re-evaluation.
Background Their were six civilian deaths in the Cook County building fire. These civilians entered stairways to exit the building. The doors of the stairways were locked. The fatalities occurred in the stairway used by the CFD to enter the fire floor to suppress the fire. The victims were found several floors above the fire. There were many issues raised and subsequent changes made by both the CFD and the Chicago City Council. There were two separate investigation, the Mikva Commission and the Witt Commission.
The first corrective action taken was a revision to the building ordinances requiring that stairway doors be electrically controlled so that the CFD could unlock the doors. This would allow anyone in the stairway to seek refuge on a higher floor. When this building was designed, the stairways were not locked. It also did not have sprinklers. Locking the stairways was a subsequent response to improve security in the wake of a rash of rapes in Loop buildings (the law of unintended consequences). The new recommendation was to have civilians in floors above the fire stay where they were and have the CFD organize search and evacuation as their first priority. The thought was to avoid forcing entry onto the fire floor until evacuations had succeeded. And there are two competing sprinkler ordinances on the agenda for the next council meeting.
The actual fire suppression occurred with water being projected upward from snorkels extended up from the street to a level a few floors below the fire. This diminished the intensity of the fire enough so that the attack from the stairway was effective.
Timeline The first alarm was received about 6:30 PM though witnesses stated they started smelling smoke as early as 6 to 6:15 PM. One witness indicated seeing smoke from above the dropped ceiling (a light fixture is the suspected source in the County fire). If true, it indicates that fires in the ceiling plenum can build a lot of headway before becoming visible to occupants. Lesson - At the first hint of smoke call in the alarm and get off that floor! A corollary is that sprinklers or smoke detectors do not work well with fires above the ceiling. These hidden fires can be deadly. The fire was located on the 29th floor, well above the reach of the snorkels. The CFD seemed to be executing their new strategy to perfection. There was no externally visible effort at suppression for roughly two hours. At that time the CFD was able to get hoses to the roofs of two ells projecting from the building face at the 26th floor. Visible reduction of the flames ensued. It looked like a successful effort. But at about three hours into the incident, the fire spread to the 30th floor, which was quickly a raging inferno. It took firefighters about five hours to extinguish all visible flames. It was quite a battle.
Observations
1) We still don’t have a way to quickly get control over these fires from inside the building. The CFD was fortunate in both fires to be able to externally apply water from outside the building. That won’t always be the case.
2) Watching these fires is boring TV to action film fans. You want to see the brave firemen swoop in with their hoses and knock down the fire. We want to cheer them on! But the plain reality is there is only so much water that can be pumped so high into the sky. The number of hoses available is less than the need. Viewers probably were asking themselves why it took so long to extinguish the last bits of flame. The likely reason is there just wasn’t enough water available. So the CFD attacked in stages and established forward operating bases (FOB) just like our soldiers in Iraq.
3) We need to develop better tools to help these brave men. Anyone with ideas should send them in. Send them to the CFD or the National Institute of Standards and Technology World Trade Center
Investigation Team which is conducting extensive research into high rise fires. Or if you’re shy, e-mail them to me at
machiasprivateer@hotmail.com. Maybe we can start a discussion group. I’ve been mulling an idea to mix liquid carbon dioxide with the water as its pumped into the standpipe. Then you’d have two-phase flow at the fire, liquid water which would flash to steam and accumulate at the ceiling (the molecular weight of water is <> air). This would hopefully cut off the flow of air to the fire and snuff it out.
Here is the updated version as of 3:41 AM CST on 12/8
There was a fire in the LaSalle Bank Building @ 135 S. LaSalle in Chicago Monday night. There were no fatalities, but 37 people (23 of them firefighters) were hospitalized. Here are some first impressions based only on observation of the TV coverage.
1) Once again we are reminded of the power of the forces of nature. The Chicago Fire Department turned out over one-third of its total manpower to fight the blaze.
2) After the first two hours, the total hospitalizations were only eight of which two were firefighters. That means roughly twenty-one firefighters were injured by the effects of entering the fire floors to suppress the fire after the successful evacuation of civilians. The new strategy of “defense in place” was effective in reducing civilian casualties. The courage of the firefighters when they then went on offense is obvious.
3) The strategies adopted by the CFD in the wake of the October 17, 2003 Cook County Administration Building fire need further re-evaluation, based on this new experience. This after action report should be done with external support.
Background of the County Building Fire There were six civilian deaths in the County building fire. These civilians entered stairways from floors well above the fire to exit the building. The doors of these stairways were locked. The fatalities occurred in the stairway used by the CFD to enter the fire floor to suppress the fire. The victims were found several floors above the fire. Smoke rising up the stairwell was the cause of death. There were many issues raised and changes were instituted by both the CFD and the Chicago City Council. There were two separate independent investigations, the Mikva Commission and the Witt Commission.
The first corrective action taken was a revision to the building ordinances requiring that stairway doors be electrically controlled so that the CFD could unlock the doors. This would allow anyone in the stairway to seek refuge on a higher floor if he encountered smoke on his way out of the building. When the building had been designed, the stairways were not locked and it had no sprinklers. The decision to lock the stairways was a response to improve security in the wake of a rash of rapes in Loop buildings (plaintiffs attorneys take note- the law of unintended consequences). The new recommendation was to have civilians on floors above the fire gather in groups, call for rescue and stay where they were. The CFD would implement search and evacuation as their first priority while simultaneously adopted a “defend in place“ strategy of containing the fire. The thought was to avoid forcing entry onto the fire floor until evacuations had succeeded. Another effort was the adoption of revised sprinkler ordinances. There are two competing sprinkler ordinances on the agenda for the next council meeting.
The actual fire suppression occurred with water being projected upward from snorkels extended up from street level to about 3 floors below the fire. This stream of outside water diminished the intensity of the fire enough so that the attack from the stairway was effective.
Timeline of the LaSalle Bank Fire The first alarm was received about 6:30 PM, though some witnesses stated they started smelling smoke as early as 6 to 6:15 PM. One witness indicated seeing smoke from above the dropped ceiling (a light fixture is the suspected source in the County fire). If true, it indicates that fires in the ceiling plenum can build a lot of headway before becoming visible to occupants. Lesson - At the first hint of smoke, call in the alarm and get off that floor! A corollary is that sprinklers or smoke detectors do not work well with fires above the ceiling. These hidden fires can be deadly.
The fire was located on the 29th floor, well above the reach of the snorkels. The CFD seemed to be executing their new strategy to perfection. There was no externally visible effort at suppression for roughly two hours. At that time the CFD was able to get hoses to the roofs of two ells projecting from the building face at the 26th floor. Visible reduction of the flames ensued. It looked like a successful effort. But at about three hours into the incident, the fire spread to the 30th floor, which was quickly a raging inferno. Time had run out on the fire rating of the 30th floor! It took firefighters about five hours to extinguish all visible flames and more time to cool down the remains. It was quite a battle.
Observations
1) We still don’t have a way to quickly get control over these fires from inside the building. The CFD was fortunate in both fires to be able to externally apply water from outside the building. That won’t always be the case.
2) Watching these fires is boring TV to action film fans. You want to see the brave firemen swoop in with their hoses and knock down the fire. We want to cheer them on! But the plain reality is there is only so much water that can be pumped so high into the sky. The number of hoses available is less than the need. Viewers probably were asking themselves why it took so long to extinguish the last bits of flame. The likely reason is there just wasn’t enough water available. So the CFD attacked in stages and established forward operating bases (FOB) just like our soldiers in Iraq.
3) We need to develop better tools to help these brave men and women. Anyone with ideas should send them in. Send them to the CFD or the National Institute of Standards and Technology World Trade Center
Investigation Team which is conducting extensive research into high rise fires. Or if you’re shy, e-mail them to me at
machiasprivateer@hotmail.com. Maybe we can start a discussion group.
I’ve been mulling an idea to fight such fires with seltzer water. You mix liquid carbon dioxide with the water as its pumped into the standpipe. Then you’d have two-phase flow at the fire, a superposition of a water sprinkler system with a dry ice maker. The liquid water which would flash to steam and accumulate at the ceiling (the molecular weight of water is <> air). This would hopefully cut off the flow of air to the fire and snuff it out.
One common comment by the broadcasters was “I’m not an expert but…”. The only person worthy of this statement was a Mr. Lia of the fire sprinkler association. He told us that he used to be a firefighter. And he knows this is the bleeding edge of fire suppression. Out here there are no experts! There are many smart people bringing knowledge, experience and good will to the effort, but nobody has all the answers. This is no place for lawyers! Their first thought would be to say Mr. Lia has a “conflict of interest” because he markets sprinklers. Maybe the public should tell the plaintiff bar that they prefer to advance the state of the art and not concentrate on finding scapegoats! And people with conflicts of interest are just the sort to solve what engineers would call a bleeding edge “multi-disciplinary task“.
Addendum 5:14PM on 12/8
Since I sent the Update to you, I've had some more back-of-the-envelope ideas. If you want to append them to the article here they are:
1) Install manometers on the outside of the doors in pressurized stairways. This would allow the civilians to determine if the pressurization system is working before opening the door. (Incidentally, this is an inexpensive, passive, fail-safe system.) They'd be instructed not to enter an unpressurized stairwell, as it might be filled with smoke. During a staged evacuation, the manometer will bounce up and down as other doors open. Wait until it's up and then go. That way the stairwell never gets to a vacuum state and it resists smoke entry. You want to avoid having lots of doors open at once and drop the pressure. So the Fire Department announces "evacuate floors 28 to 30 now!" They wait a moment, then do the next few floors etc. That gives the civilians a chance to assist in their own evacuation. Then you could increase the flow of people down the stairs by sending them in staged packets as a means of flow control. Say designating floors that are a multiple of 5, marked with an "F" on the doors. Then the fast guys fill the space between packets and the slow guys don't get overrun from above. The intent is do avoid the clumping that makes rush hour traffic so maddening and slow.
2) Since the doors are now electrically locked, we could devise an "occupied" light system similar to that on airliners. The fire department could first clear the stairwell and then signal it is occupied as they force entry on the fire floor. This would allow them to attack the fire while continuing evacuation through the other stairwell(s). This would let them get at the fire earlier than if they simply wait until the whole building is evacuated.
Latest Press Accounts 4:46 AM on 12/9
Here are the latest Chicago Tribune reports that ratify my article
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-0412080341dec08,0,1913992.story?coll=chi-newslocal-hed
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-0412080342dec08,0,2307209.story?coll=chi-newslocal-hed
